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Within a mean-variance model we analyze the problem of
decentralized portfolio management. We find the solution for the optimal
portfolio allocation for a head trader operating in Qdifferent markets, which
is called the optimal centralized portfolio. However, as there are many
traders specialized in different markets, the solution to the problem of
optimal decentralized allocation should be different from the centralized
case. In this paper we derive conditions for the solutions to be equivalent.
We use multivariate normal returns and a negative exponential function to
solve the problem analytically. We generate the equivalence of solutions by
assuming that different traders face different interest rates for borrowing and
lending. This interest rate is dependent on the ratio of the degrees of risk
aversion of the trader and the head trader, on the excess return, and on the
correlation between asset returns.
JEL: G10; G11; G23.
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
The optimal allocation of investment resources to different assets is one of the
most well-known problems in finance and has been extensively studied. The most
frequent approach to solve this problem is the mean-variance analysis, which assumes
that the investor is concerned with only two parameters of the probability distribution of
total returns on investment: the mean and the variance. Markowitz [1959] and Tobin
[1958] were the first to put the trade-off between risk and return on a solid analytic
footing. Sharpe [1964] and Lintner [1965] extended the mean-variance theory to an
equilibrium theory.
Mean-variance models solve the problem of optimal portfolio allocation for a
head trader operating in Qdifferent markets. The solution to this problem is called WKH
RSWLPDO FHQWUDOL]HG DOORFDWLRQ. It is interesting to notice that if investors are von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers, then a mean-variance analysis
could be justified either by assuming quadratic utility functions or that the distribution
of asset returns is multivariate normal. We could solve the problem analytically for a
quadratic utility function, but, as Huang and Litzenberger [1988] observed, the quadratic
utility function exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion, which implies that risky assets
are inferior goods. This unappealing property induced the use of a negative exponential
utility function.
In practice, most investment firms operate with a head trader leading a number
of traders specialized in different markets. The head trader gives general guidelines. One
of these guidelines is a common benchmark rate, the interest rate that each trader faces
when drawing resources from the firm to invest in risky assets. However traders solve
their problem for optimal allocation in a decentralized way. The aggregation of the
investment decisions by the specialized traders is called WKH RSWLPDO GHFHQWUDOL]HG
VROXWLRQ. In general, the optimal decentralized solution is different from the centralized
one for a number of reasons: different risk aversion, different probability distributions of
assets, etc. Therefore the mean-variance analysis is of limited use for big investment
firms that have many specialized traders.6
Decentralization of the investment process has not been a major theme in the
finance literature for the past decades. Sharpe [1980] has been one of the first
researchers to notice this gap, stating that “more research on this subject is needed”.
Sharpe [1980] explained the rationale for having multiple managers in charge of
a single portfolio with two arguments, namely, specialization and diversification.
Specialization would be justified by the need of superior skills for the analysis of certain
types of industries and diversification would be a natural way to hedge against bad
decisions taken by a single manager.
Barry and Stark [1984] analyzed the phenomenon of multiple managers using
the principal-agent theory approach. They developed a model to show that risk-sharing
considerations alone are sufficient to produce a decision to employ multiple agents
(even in the absence of specialization and diversification).
In this paper we derive the conditions under which the centralized and
decentralized solutions are equivalent. This is important because the mean-variance
model could then be implemented by firms with decentralized investment decisions, as
most large trading firms are.
We solve the problem with different, increasing levels of generalization. In all
levels, we solve the optimal centralized and decentralized portfolio problem for Q risky
assets assuming that each agent has a negative exponential utility function and that rates
of returns of risky assets are multivariate normally distributed, so the problem can be
solved via a deterministic equivalent. The interest rate for borrowing or lending by the
traders is used as control variable. We use Stevens’ [1998] characterization of the
inverse of the covariance matrix to get a closed-form optimal solution.
In the basic case, we suppose each trader trades in one risky asset and one
riskless asset. Allowing the interest rate for the riskless asset to be different for different
traders we generate the equivalence for the centralized and decentralized solutions.
Furthermore, we show that the trader interest rate depends on the ratio of the degree of
risk aversion of the trader and head trader, on the excess return, and on the correlations
between assets.7
In the first generalization we allow each trader to trade in P different risky assets
but with an empty intersection between subsets of risky assets managed by traders. In
the second generalization we assume that traders manage the same subset of risky assets.
Finally, we allow each trader to manage any subset of risky assets.
In section II we find the optimal solutions for the head trader and the traders, and
establish the equivalence condition for the basic case. In section III we perform
comparative static. Section IV presents the generalizations. Section V summarizes the
results and concludes the paper.
7KH(TXLYDOHQFHRI&HQWUDOL]HGDQG'HFHQWUDOL]HG6ROXWLRQV7KH%DVLF&DVH
In this section we consider the case where each trader manages one risky asset
and one risk-free asset. First we calculate the head trader centralized solution, where he
manages all assets, making no use of specialized traders. Then we calculate the
decentralized solution, where specialized traders manage risky assets. Because each
trader looks at the risk of only one asset when making his investment decision, in the
aggregate the traders’ solutions usually will not be compatible with the Markowitz (head
trader) solution for the portfolio of all risky assets. We then calculate the conditions for
the centralized and decentralized solutions to coincide.
+HDG7UDGHU&HQWUDOL]HG6ROXWLRQ
We consider a head trader having an initial wealth :0 to invest in Q risky assets
and a risk-free asset  I  for a finite investment period. Let  M U %  be the stochastic return of
risky asset M,  I U  be the return of the risk-free asset,  M a  be the proportion of wealth
invested in the MWK risky asset, and a I be the fraction of wealth invested in the risk-free
asset during the investment period. Then () 0 1 MM U: a + %  is returned at the end of the
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To have a closed form solution, we assume that returns are multivariate normally
distributed with mean vector U  and covariance matrix  . We solve the optimal
portfolio problem for the head trader with a negative exponential utility function,
8: H
D: bg =-
- 1 , where D is the strictly positive absolute risk aversion. In this case the
head trader problem can be written as:
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where  I: ~ di is a normal density function. Under the assumptions, the above problem
(2.1) has a certainty equivalent given by:
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where  () 1,, Q aa ¢ = L  is a xQ vector of risky assets weights,






















is the QQ ´  covariance matrix for risky assets. Assuming that all initial wealth is
invested, we have the following Lagrangean function for the head trader:
                                                
1 “ ¢ [ ” is the transpose of [.9
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where  ˆ U is the Q´1 vector of excess returns.
7UDGHUV¶'HFHQWUDOL]HG6ROXWLRQ
We assume that there are Q traders; each one specialized in a different risky
asset. The LWK trader has initial wealth : L 0, , allocated to him by the head trader, to
invest in a risky asset L. Let  , LL a  be the fraction of his initial wealth invested in the risky
asset,  L D be his coefficient of risk aversion, UI L ,  be the risk-free return the LWK trader pays
to the firm to allocate wealth in his risky asset’s investment. In other words, UIL ,  is the
benchmark of the LWK trader. The use of different benchmarks for different traders is the10
instrument the head trader will use to make traders’ decentralized solutions compatible
with Markowitz’s in the aggregate. The Lagrangean function for the LWK trader is:
() ()
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By controlling : L 0, , the head trader can guarantee that the optimal solution is
indeed an interior solution. Expression (2.11) shows that the proportion of initial wealth
invested in the risky asset is decreasing in wealth, an inconvenient byproduct of the
hypothesis that traders have exponential utility functions.
(TXLYDOHQFHRI&HQWUDOL]HGDQG'HFHQWUDOL]HG6ROXWLRQV
The condition for the decentralized optimal choices (for the Q traders) to be
equivalent to the optimal centralized choice of the head trader is:
,0 , 0 ,      for   1, , LL L L :: L Q aa == K .  (2.12)
Solving for the risk-free rate for the LWK trader
2
,0 I LLL L L UU D : sa =-  (2.13)




















2  and bLM  are the R-squared and the coefficients in the multiple
regression of the excess return of the LWK asset on the excess returns of the other assets.
The factor s LL
22 1- R c h  is the part of the variance of the LWK return that cannot be
explained by the regression on the other risky excess returns, which is equivalent to the
estimate of the variance of the regression residual. So the denominator in this expression
is the part of asset L
Vvariance that cannot be diversified away times the absolute risk
aversion. The numerator is proportional to the difference between asset L
Vexcess return
and the sum of other risky assets’ excess return weighted by the respective coefficient in
the multiple regression. Substituting (2.14) in (2.13) we have
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where  + D represents the head trader’s coefficient of risk aversion. If the head trader and
all traders have the same coefficient of risk aversion, the above expression simplifies to
UU U U U U I LL
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The head trader can use (2.15) (or (2.16)) to control traders in their optimal
allocation problems. In the calculation of trader L¶soptimal solution we have made the
assumption that he maximizes the expected utility of the wealth he manages,
(8: ( H
D: L ~ ~ di =-
- 1 . However, trader L should maximize the expected utility of his
own payoff. If his payoff is a fixed proportion d L of the wealth he manages he should12
maximize the function  (8: ( H
LL : ~ ~ di =-
- 1
hd , where hL is his true coefficient of risk
aversion
2. If we define DLL L =d h  we can easily see that the problem does not change.
Further generalizations of the traders’ payoff function could be made. An
interesting case arises when traders have unlimited liability. For example, their payoff
can be the excess of final wealth over a benchmark %, as  () LL :: % t =- %% , where the
benchmark is non-stochastic and ti is the fraction of the excess wealth that trader L
receives.
However, more general compensation schemes may not work within this
approach. An interesting example is the introduction of options in the compensation
scheme. Traders receive a fixed fee I and, in addition, an option based on the excess
wealth that they have generated, as  max 0, LL L :I : % t éù =+ - ëû
%% .
One further simplification of expression (2.15) obtains when we assume that
assets returns are independent. In this case, (2.15) becomes:
() ,
L
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In this case, if the head trader imposes :: L 00 , =  and UU I LI , = , that is to say,
gives all wealth to LWK trader and uses as benchmark rate the interest rate that the trading
firm faces, then the decentralized solution is equivalent to the centralized one as (2.18)
gives the same allocation as (2.11), which is the trader L’s solution if and only if the LWK
trader and the head trader have the same risk aversion coefficient.
                                                
2   As defined in Arrow [1970] and Pratt [1964].13
&RPSDUDWLYH6WDWLF
Equation (2.15) gives us a sufficient condition for the decentralized and
centralized problems to coincide in the sense that the dollar amount invested in each
risky asset will be the same in both problems. The dollar amount invested in the riskless
asset is different though. However, this is irrelevant because traders’ investments in
riskless assets are only notional; it is the firm paying interest to itself.
If we look at equations (2.11) and (2.14) we can say that, ceteris paribus, if the
expected return of the LWK asset increases, both head trader and traders would invest
more in this risky asset. But from (2.15), for them to increase the investment in the risky















The sign of (3.1) depends on the ratio of risk aversion coefficients. The term that
pre-multiplies this ratio is greater than one. If the coefficients of risk aversion are similar
and the return on asset Lis highly correlated with other risky assets’ returns (high 
2
L 5 ),
equation (3.1) implies that trader L¶Vbenchmark should be reduced, leading to further
investment in risky asset L by trader L This is because the head trader would reduce
investments not only in the riskless asset but also in the other risky assets correlated
with asset L. Since trader L does not invest in other risky assets, he has to draw relatively
more money from his riskless asset. Off course, the risk-free rate of other traders that
trade risky assets positively correlated with the LWKtrader would increase to compensate
the overshooting in the reduction of investment in the riskless asset made by trader L
(this is illustrated by equation (3.2) below)
However, if the head trader is much more risk averse than trader L and risky
assets are not very correlated, so that the ratio of risk averse coefficient times the inverse
of 
2 (1 ) L 5 -  is less than one, trader L¶V benchmark should increase in order to14
counterbalance the increase in LWK asset expected return. Otherwise, differences in risk
aversion would generate different centralized and decentralized allocations.
If the expected return ofLWK risky asset increases and its return is positively
correlated with MWK risky asset we should have a substitution effect decreasing
investment in the MWK asset. This is captured by equation (3.2) bellow:
,
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When the head trader increases the risk-free rate for traders he induces a risk
exposure reduction. If  ML b
 is negative then the correlation between LWK and MWK asset
returns is negative. In this case, investment in the MWK asset increases with increase in
expected return in the LWK asset because it can be used to hedge an increase of
investment in the LWK asset.
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One important generalization would be to allow traders to trade in more than one
market. Actually, most firms have traders specialized in a few assets. In this section we
allow traders to trade in subsets of risky assets and find the equivalence condition for the
optimal portfolio allocation. To simplify understanding, we make this generalization in
four steps. First, we study a typical trader solution. Second, we generalize the
equivalence result where traders trade in non-intersecting subsets of risky assets. Third,15
we study the case where traders trade in the same subset of risky assets. Finally, we
allow traders to trade in any subset of risky assets.
7UDGHUL¶VVROXWLRQ
We use an amount of wealth and one benchmark for each risky asset, so if the L
WK trader manages P risky assets there will be P risk-free rates to control his optimal
decisions. This LWK trader has initial wealth  , NL : , allocated to him by the head trader, to
invest in the NWK risky asset. He has a different wealth available for each asset. Let  , NL a
be the fractions of initial wealth invested in the NWK risky asset, by the LWK trader. Let
, N I L U  be the risk-free return the trader pays to the firm to use wealth in his NWK risky asset
investment. The Lagrangean function for the LWK trader is:
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Assuming interior solution for each risky asset so that all Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers are zero, the first order conditions are given by:
()
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Observing that when a trader has exponential utility the amount he invests in the
risky assets is independent of wealth, we can make, without loss of generality, the
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Using the same approach as in section 2 we derive the proportion to be allocated
in the NWK risky asset by the LWK trader.
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to generate the equivalence, we derive:
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, RNL and 
2
k R  are the R-squared for the multiple regression of the excess return for
the NWK asset on the excess returns of P risky markets for the LWK trader and the R-
squared for the multiple regression of the excess return for the head trader for all the Q
risky assets, respectively.  Solving this equation for the risk-free rate for the NWK asset
we derive:17
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Thus we have P equations that must be determined simultaneously for  , N I L U  and
, M I L U  for  1,... ; MP M N =¹ .
7KHFDVHZKHUHWUDGHUVWUDGHLQQRQLQWHUVHFWLQJVXEVHWVRIULVN\DVVHWV
If there are many traders, each with a subset of the full asset basket, without
intersection between these subsets, then all that the head trader has to do is to solve
these systems separately for each trader. We are assuming that traders are not
specialized in the same assets, but instead, all traders take decisions regarding different
assets.
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.If we assume that assets returns are independent then it does not matter whether
the traders solve the problem in a decentralized or centralized way, the optimal solution
will be the same.
7KHFDVHZKHUHWUDGHUVWUDGHLQWKHVDPHVXEVHWVRIULVN\DVVHWV
Another generalization would be the case were there are O traders taking
decisions in P risky markets and the head trader’s asset basket is composed of Q risky
assets, where QP > . We assume that all traders observe the same P risky assets and
take allocation decisions in these markets based on their inferences for expected return,
risk and their own degrees of risk aversion. To generate equivalence one would need:
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We have the following system to solve, in matrix notation:
[ ]
1
11 1 PP PP P P P
-
´´ ´ ´ ´ =´ ´ - I UEEU $ (4.8)
where  PP ´ E  is the same as defined before,  1 P´ I U  is a vector of risk-free rates for









èø å  is the NWK
element of the vector  1 P´ $ .7KHJHQHUDOFDVH
The final generalization would be the case where each trader’s portfolio is a
subset of the global portfolio. Assuming that an allocation made by the head trader is a
vector in 
Q Â  we would have traders’ portfolios in subspaces 
Q O Â Í Â , where  Q O £ .
Different traders can build portfolios in such a way that the intersection of assets
between portfolios is not always an empty set. This would be the most general case. Let
L M, a  be the allocation made by the LWK trader in MWK asset. Then, we have
( ) L L L I L I
L L
L M L M : D U U U
N M , 0 , , , , , , , , , ~ S =a a . (4.9)
The allocation in the MWK asset depends on expected returns, covariance matrix
on assets traded by theLWK trader, on the risk-free interest rates for each asset, on his
risk aversion coefficient and on his initial endowment.
If we assume that there are O traders, and Q assets, then equivalence can be
achieved if the condition below is satisfied:
       () 0 , 0 , 0 , , ,
1 1
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    Q M ,... 2 , 1 = (4.10)
The solution would be the same as found in the previous case with a slight
difference
3: traders trade in subsets of the global portfolio, so by construction some  L M, a
are zero (for some asset M and trader L). This means that the matrixes used before would
have some zero elements.
Another way to look at condition (4.10) would be that we have a system with Q
equations and Q unknown parameters (risk-free interest rates for each asset). As this is a
linear system, if the determinant of the system is different from zero (which generally
is), we always have a solution for it that can be implemented numerically.
                                                
3 As before we can assume that the benchmark on MWK asset is the same for all traders which trade
on that asset.21
To do that we need to estimate the risk aversion coefficient for each trader,
which is not an especially difficult task. Then the implementation of the methodology of
this paper in a real world situation could be easily done by allowing traders to trade with
some predetermined amount of wealth and benchmark for each asset he trades.
6XPPDU\
In this paper conditions were derived for the solutions to the centralized and
decentralized problems to be equivalent. This is important because the mean-variance
model can be implemented by firms with decentralized decisions, as most large trading
firms are. This equivalence is established for the case when traders have no better
information than the head trader. The next step in our research agenda is to study the
case when traders are better informed than the head trader.
We show that if the head trader uses a different interest rate for each trader to
borrow or lend as control variable, he can achieve the same allocation with the
decentralized portfolio decision problem as in the centralized portfolio decision
problem. Furthermore, we found that this interest rate depends on the ratio of the degree
of risk aversion of the trader and head trader, on excess returns, and on correlation of
assets.
We allow traders to trade in P markets and found that in this framework it is
possible to achieve the same allocation with the decentralized portfolio decision
problem as in the centralized one as we use the interest rate to borrow or lend as a
control variable. In this case the head trader must solve P simultaneous equations to
find these interest rates simultaneously. The same problem is solved for the case where
all traders trade at the same subset of the global assets. Finally, a general solution is
shown, where traders are allowed to trade in any subset of risky assets.
Further generalizations would be dropping the CARA utility function
assumption and using an intertemporal framework. Besides, allowing for short sales
would be an interesting issue to examine. Sometimes traders may want to stay short in22
the market and the principal (head trader) could supply them with collateral (instead of
money).23
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